BOOK REVIEWS

Resurrection and Moral Imagination, by Sarah Bachelard. Routledge, 2016.
Pp. x + 209. $89.60 (cloth), $39.96 (paperback).
JAMES G. HANINK, Inglewood, CA
“In the long run we are all dead.” So wrote John Maynard Keynes. He did
not thereby endorse a devil-may-care attitude. Rather he meant to remind
economists that long-term projections cannot forever ignore pressing economic needs. Keynes, of course, did not write anything about Christ’s Resurrection from the dead, much less that we can share in his Resurrection.
What that sharing means, however, is the question that Sarah Bachelard
explores in the book under review.
Paul, to be sure, had much to say about Christ’s Resurrection and its
import for us. “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile,” indeed,
“If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be
pitied” (1 Cor. 15: 17, 19).
Bachelard takes the Resurrection to heart. As an “eschatological event”
that reaches from the past and across the present into the future, it reshapes our moral imagination and revises our very experience of time
(88). A personal impetus led to her welcome investigation. She writes that
“Fifteen years ago . . . I was immersed in doctoral work in moral philosophy, focused on the writing of Iris Murdoch, Raimond Gaita and Cora
Diamond. In these thinkers I had found what seemed to be the necessary
and sufficient bridge between my lived moral experience and a Christian
tradition that I no longer found credible or attractive” (1). Yet a few years
later, at once “astonished, bewildered and slightly terrified,” she returned
to Christian faith (1). She found herself trying to come to terms with the
significance of the risen Christ and do so in a way that might engage the
very mentors whom she continued to hold in the highest regard. The result
of this engagement, at once a dialogue with doubt and a call to renewal, is
this new monograph.
Sarah Bachelard’s contributions are many and notable. As a matter of
context, her careful scholarship puts in play the varied strains of thought
not only of her original mentors but also figures like Dietrich Bonhoeffer
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and Simone Weil—as well as the contemporary writers James Alison, Brian
Robinette, and Rowan Williams. As a matter of perspective, Bachelard
writes as a theologian intent on letting theology be theology; she will not
allow it to be a handmaid of the idols of the tribe. “All reflection,” she
observes, “begins somewhere,” and “even secular liberalism presumes a
background picture of reality” that is not open to proof (154).
Bachelard presents and develops several themes critical to Christian
life. A first, linked with her contemplative background, is that wisdom
comes from a union with God; it is a union that issues in a love stronger
than death. A second is that the journey to this union brings us through
the cross and into new life. A third is that in the Resurrection we find a
peace that overshadows fear and brings “the lightness or hilaritas of the
saint” (188). A fourth is that Christ’s victory over death shows us that we
need not define ourselves in opposition to one another in the countless
ways that we have supposed we must. A fifth is that in the Resurrection an
“unselfing” becomes possible, since now we can see ourselves as existing
in God’s love. A sixth is that a Resurrection ethics is “revelatory, vulnerable, and compassionate” and subverts the unredeemed structures which
resist transformation (93). It presents a new horizon that “sets us free from
preoccupation with our own goodness or innocence and invites us into
the adventure of a future lived in and from God’s life” (191).
For Bachelard, a theologian of journey and transformation, Christian
reflection is always an open inquiry. In this spirit, we might turn to a
series of questions that her work poses. Quite rightly, she recognizes that
in theological discourse “saying less” is not enough. Yes, Wittgenstein in
his Lecture on Ethics says that “the experience of feeling absolutely safe”
is a way that religious language might try “to go beyond the world”;
Bachelard, however, suggests that a theology of “the resurrection encounters” can tell us more about the sort of “depth experience of the human
condition” which he seems to have in mind (40–41n29). Nor would she
accept Wittgenstein’s view that “The historical accounts in the Gospels
might, historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would
lose nothing by this” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value [University
of Chicago Press, 1984], 32e).
The question arises, nonetheless, whether Bachelard is always alert to
theological discourse that seems to be “saying more” but is very likely
“saying less.” An example: she movingly recounts the martyrdom of Trappist monks in Algeria at the hands of radical Islamists. The monks, she
thinks, faced death while already living in a time that shares in eternity.
“There is not a separate, heavenly time,” she writes, “given to the monks
as a ‘reward’ for being good” (92). Yet she approves a film’s portrayal of
their last meal as “a foretaste of the heavenly banquet” (92). But how can
there be a “foretaste” of heaven if it has no distinct time? And how are
we to interpret Paul’s farewell to Timothy: “I have fought the good fight,
I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up
for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge,

BOOK REVIEWS

259

will award to me on that Day, and not only to me but also to all who have
loved his appearing” (2 Timothy 4: 7–8)?
A second example of “saying more” turning out to be “saying less”
comes with Bachelard’s often perceptive analysis of oppositional identity
formation: we habitually seek to define ourselves over and against “the
others.” Christ’s Resurrection opens the way for us to share in God’s life,
and we can say more about who we are. How? It does so by “making it
possible for people to enter into the dynamic of the undoing of any form
of ‘sacred’ belonging” (177). This is a puzzling dynamic. Where, then, do
we belong? Is this newly realized eschatology at odds with Christ’s Kingdom? If so, for what are we to pray? From what temptation do we ask
deliverance?
A third example of “saying more” that might become “saying less” develops in Bachelard’s analysis of the Enlightenment’s autonomous self, a
self that mimics the Enlightenment deity. Feminists, she notes, have come
to see the surrender of the autonomous self, even to God, as a jettisoning of
the self. It is a kind of violence. Yet this autonomous self is the strange fruit
of a mistaken anthropology. For Bachelard, the self is relational. Authentic “unselfing” is not destructive. Rather, it puts aside “that in us which
maintains the illusion of separateness,” namely the struggle “to possess or
secure the self over against others” (101). In contrast, if I yield myself “into
God’s life,” then I am transformed, since now “I am not striving to enact
love as a norm but becoming more transparent to [its] reality” (102). Now
“my selfhood is constituted by its relation to God’s giving life” (102). Just
as the Trinitarian life is relational, so too is mine.
But perhaps Bachelard is too quick. Note that if we speak of the relational, we must speak as well of that which is in relation. I can be brought
into a new relation with God, but the relation does not constitute my life.
Nor can we speak of a relation as an agent. Rather it is agents who act in
relation to one another. Moreover, to be a free agent requires a certain
mastery of oneself. This mastery is a mark of personhood. Or so it has
seemed to the perennial philosophy. If we are to speak of the Trinity, and
it is well to do so, Thomas Aquinas teaches that the distinction of persons
therein is relational. In light of God’s simplicity, however, this relationality
is subsisting; it is not other than God’s nature. Thus, Thomas contends
that “in this sense it is true that ‘person’ signifies relation directly and nature indirectly, yet relation is signified, not as relation, but as hypostasis”
(Summa Theologiae 1a 29, 4).
Here I would like to introduce a fresh pair of reflections, both in aid of further advancing a Thomist engagement with Bachelard’s Resurrection ethic.
The first intervention addresses her account of a dualism between good and
evil. Bachelard finds instructive Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the
Fall in terms of humankind’s taking on a supposed knowledge of good and
evil that is fundamentally distorted. It is a knowledge “apart from God,”
and, indeed, “any conception of ‘good’ that can be opposed to ‘evil’ is itself
already outside of God, which means that it cannot be truly Good” (60). We
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must, accordingly, reject any of the shop-worn dualisms of good and evil.
If we do not, we make ourselves into judges who think themselves to be independent of God. To take such a stance is, in practice, to join the Pharisees.
Again, this conclusion seems too quick, even a rush to judgment. Christians, in any case, affirm that all that the Creator brought into existence,
and sustains in existence, is itself good. Nonetheless, we daily encounter
evil. Good, however, is not dependent on evil. It is evil, rather, that is a
parasitic privation—a warping distortion—of that which is good. On this
view, that of Augustine as well as Thomas, reflection on good and evil
leads us to the very contrast of being and non-being. Metaphysics, if this
be such, is not at odds with Creation so long as metaphysics is the study
of the real and so long as the real is both finite and infinite. To be sure,
religious language is analogical, but the Creator is the primary analogate.
A second Thomist intervention addresses Bachelard’s account of moral
ambiguity. She repeatedly rejects what she calls “systems of goodness”
that pit in-groups (of various sorts) against outcasts. Nonetheless, she rejects “antinomianism” as well as “moralism” (66). Yet it is anything but
clear what counts as doing good and doing harm in many of the complex
situations that we face (for example, with regard to issues bearing on the
beginning and end of human life, of political authority, of marriage and
sexuality, and of immigration). In the order of grace, she insists, the dynamic of the moral life “prevents” its “becoming merely another system
of goodness, a fixed measure according to which we can assess our moral
performance” (88). We are to be present to each person as an “unrepeatable particularity” (95). Even failure can guide our way: “the truth is that
sometimes it is only in the failure of sincerely undertaken commitments
and endeavours that we . . . are able to name and repent of the deeper
‘sins’ that have brought us to this point” (172). Here a Thomist would
readily agree that each person is unique. Yet each of us must, in applying
the moral law, “grasp the universal in his own singular existence . . . face
to face with God” (Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent [Doubleday,
1956], 67). Here, too, reason is a friend rather than a foe. Indeed, Thomas
writes that reason is the root of all liberty (De Veritate, 24, 2). To each of us,
and to us all, Christ says, “If you love me, you will keep my commandments” (John 14:15). No existential tension changes this.
For Bachelard, though, reason is a dodgy friend. Too close an embrace
of it risks “rationalism” and blindness to God’s “radical otherness” (105).
Thomas, to be sure, was no friend of intellectual posturing. But such
posturing presupposes reason. Yes, sin undermines our capacity to act
reasonably, as virtue requires—but not without limit. “[S]in cannot,” he
observes, “entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being,
for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible
for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely” (ST I-II, q. 85, a. 2). Pride,
a deadly vice, can spring from reason gone wrong. But without a chastened reason, we cannot appreciate the intelligibility of Creation or, as we
must, learn to speak to one another across our broken cultures.
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Bachelard would agree that we must speak to one another, and speak
especially to the least little ones among us. She would agree, too, that it is
the mission of the Church to do so and that the philosophy of our academies cannot supplant that mission. There is not space enough to explore
her ecclesiology. One might at least note, though, that her Church celebrates the sacraments, each of which celebrates life. A reason subservient
to the idols of the tribe continues to find one such sacrament, a Sacrament
of Resurrection, an insuperable scandal. How is it that Jesus dares to say,
“unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have
no life in you: he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life,
and I will raise him up on the last day” (John 6:53–54)?
A closing link? Keynes tells us that in the end we are all dead. With a
Resurrection ethic and its imagination, we could counter that everything
depends on “the end.” Might we not propose that “it is immortals whom
we joke with, work with, marry, snub, and exploit—immortal horrors or everlasting splendors” (C. S. Lewis, Weight of Glory [Harper Collins, 2001], 47)?

Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, by Michael Gorman.
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 177. $99.99 (hardcover).
ANNA MARMODORO, Durham University and University of Oxford
That Christ was a person with both a divine and a human nature is for
Aquinas a fact that faith commands us to accept, but that a theologian also
needs to understand as fully as possible. In his lucid, deep, and beautifully
written book, Michael Gorman sets out to investigate Aquinas’s life-long
attempt to understand the incarnation of God in Christ.
The book is composed of six chapters. The first and the second chapter
introduce the reader to the key concepts of person and nature, and argue for
the interpretation that “Aquinas is best read as thinking that the off-the-rack
philosophical notion of nature is inadequate for Christological purposes.
Something tailor-made—a modified notion of ‘nature’ is required” (9). Such
Thomistic-type of nature will include, writes Gorman, what an Aristoteliantype of nature includes, and in addition “accidents, individuating principles,
and so on”; in the case of a human nature, accidents such as that of speaking
Aramaic, which is “connected to and rooted in Christ’s human nature, even
if it does not belong to that nature” (45). The reason why Aquinas feels the
need to introduce this expanded notion of nature is to be able to express all
that Christology requires him to say about Christ, which a more restricted,
Aristotelian understanding of nature would not cover. Naturally this move
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